Khaliji Security

Dear All,

The following is an attached file (translated from English into Arabic) of how the Chechens Defeated Russian Armor in a Built up urban environment, which is very relevant to the situation in Syria. Assad is fielding many of the same armored vehicles the Russians used. This document shows the different weak points of the Russian-made Armored Vehicles. Assad’s military fields the T-72 Tank and the BMP-2 Armored Vehicle as explained in the doc. If you know anyone who could make use of this, please send it around. Many thanks to the anonymous translator who made this possible. You have made a big contribution. Bless you sir. redthrust

Thanks to @ZacLeBurn for providing me with the link to “The Future Military: Your Budget Strategy”. This is a calculator made by the New York Times which considers budget cuts that the US could perform, and needs to perform over the next decade. Its a great mental excersize, and I would highly recommend it. The goal is to achieve $450 Billion in budget cuts for the US military. I managed $743 Billion in budget cuts while still (in my view) preserving US force capabilities. An overview of the cuts follows:

The rationale for these cuts follows:

First, I did not make any cuts in Benefits or Salaries. The first and foremost asset of any military force is its’ manpower, and offering proper benefits and salaries allows a force to recruit the best. The technological factor will certainly change across time, but manpower must be kept in its best shape. Its important that benefits that have been given to the military not be removed except in cases where it is absolutely necessary. I guess part of it is also that I am a firm believer in free, universal health-care.

Second, cuts in Personnel. Wars will be fought with much more manpower-efficient militaries in the future. The US is not an exception. Be it Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, or Automated artillery loaders, war, as industry, will go into a much more efficient cycle where much greater automation takes place. This may still be a decade away, but preparing for the the upswing in automation in advance is necessary. The US army and marines would take a 35% cut in Personnel, while the Pentagon would take a 20% cut in staff.

Third, Weapons and Procurement. In anticipation of an increase in Chinese Aeronautical Technology Sophistication, as represented by their J-12 fighter Jet program, I have left the US’s F-35 budget untouched. The US needs to have a first-rate sophisticated fighter in anticipation of Russian and Chinese Technological developments. I reduced the number of aircraft carriers in the US fleet from 11 to 10, both because of an expected increase in the range of future aircraft (partially negating the need for aircraft carriers), as well as the fact that every other country with an aircraft carrier has 1 or 2 at the most. The Chinese have said that they want to expand to 6 aircraft carriers in the future, but with an expected eventual slowdown in Chinese growth, this may be difficult to achieve. The US navy will also suffer reduced ship buying, with the cancellation of 5 amphibious ships, the retirement of 6 Ticonderoga-class cruisers, a reduction in submarine purchasing (when has the US ever used those?) and the purchases of 12 instead of 55 littoral combat ships.

Fourth, Nuclear and Missile Forces. I would eliminate the use of nuclear weapons on bombers, and restrict it to cruise missiles/ballistic missiles instead. TheUS is probably never going to use a nuclear weapon at war again, and continuing to use it on bombers is when cruise missiles and ballistic missiles do the job is neither practical nor efficient. Bombers also need escorting/SEAD operations in hostile airspaces.

Fifth, Operations and Maintenance. I would reduce military personnel staged in Europe and Asia from 150,000 to 100,000. This would leave smaller scale and perhaps more token units that would be expected to contribute to regional security until (if necessary) reinforcements arrive from the mainland US or other theaters . The increase in US deployment capabilities (such as the introduction of highly mobile Stryker brigades) allows for a reduction in threatre- and forward-deployment. Military personnel who perform commercial activities would also be replaced by civilian personnel. Spending on base support services would decrease to a consistent standard per serviceman. A Pentagon audit, never previously attempted would help reduce costs. As the war in Iraq is ‘over’ and the war in Afghanistan begins to draw to a ‘conclusion’, recruiting expenses should be cut, in tandem with the reduction of military and civilian manpower.

Balancing between trying to be the strongest military in the world, and trying to reduce spending and indebtedness will definetly be tricky.

Dear All,

Please Find a List of My Articles in Defense and Security Below:

A Well-Armed UAE Military Requires Discerning Buyers The National

Myth of the Iranian Bear Gulf News

A Volunteer National Guard Would Build on Strength The National

Iran does not have an arsenal to back up its many threats The National

Updated: 4th of January 2012

Ahmed Al-Attar

The recent sale by Russia of Yakhont (Oniks P-800 for those using the official name) missiles to Syria must raise some serious red flags, especially as Syria is currently undergoing a civil-war of sorts where it most likely will not need to use them.

There is also the fact that with economic sanctions tightening, the Syrians don’t have the money to spend on such a weapons purchase, and that money for this deal must have come from an outside source.

Russia claims that the end-user will be Syrian. But how valid are these claims and promises by Syria when it is well-known that the Syrians supplied advanced AT-14 anti-tank missiles to Hezbollah pre-2006?

I’m going to go on a limb here and say that the Yakhonts are being funneled through Syria to Iran. The Yakhonts could prove an effective addition to the Iranian inventory of Anti-Ship Missiles (ASMs). The Iranians maintain ASMs as an integral part of their naval doctrine in case of any future confrontation with the US/GCC. Any ASMs shipped to them not only give them more reason to feel secure, but also pose a large threat to naval traffic.

The increased range of the Yakhont is an example. The nominal maximum range of the Yakhont is 300kms, versus the next best developed weapon in Irans arsenal, the C-802 which has a range of around 120-150kms.

The figure below shows the impact of this increase in range. In red is the range of the C-802 if fired from positions on the Iranian side of the Arabian Gulf. In blue is the Yakhont.  With the Yakhont, the Iranians would be able to target the US 5th fleet stationed in Bahrain. And the rule is that any ASM can be converted into a cruise missile as the 2003 war in Iraq showed.

The Syria of today is in a corner, and should be more willing (and even desperate) to please Iran, by giving it access to the Yakhont missiles. It could also be keen to “strike back” at the Gulf States, attempting to send a message that it will supply Iran with its arms if the embargo continues. An international, effectively enforced arms embargo on Syria is necessary in order to avoid future incidents like this. Another likely recipient of these missiles could be Hezbollah.

I recently wrote this essay as part of a Masters degree application for War Studies. Thought some of you might find it interesting.

If Saddam had read Clausewitz

One of the longest and bloodiest wars in Middle Eastern History, the Iran-Iraq war began in 1980 and only ended in 1988 [1]. The conflict would ultimately lead to the beginning of the end of the Iraqi Baathist state, define the Iranian state’s political direction [2] and make the strategic balance in the Gulf far more dynamic and fluid than the preceding decades.

As opposed to the US-led Persian Gulf War, the Iran-Iraq war was between two regional belligerents without foreign ‘boots on the ground’. A larger, better-equipped Iranian military1 had great structural and organizational deficiencies due to Ayatollah Khomeini’s recent purge of regular military officers and his emphasis on the Basij/ Pasadaran Militias2. A smaller, more moderately equipped but administratively intact Iraqi army faced it. That the balance of power was quite evenly distributed in the initial stages of the war allows for the strategy of the conflict to be scrutinized far more objectively than the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, where the Iraqis were overwhelmingly outmatched. The Iran-Iraq war began with an Iraqi general offensive in 1980. In trying to achieve his objectives, Saddam violated several principles outlined in Clausewitz’s memoirs “On War”.

When Saddam launched the opening offensive of the war in 1980, his objective was to seize the Arab-populated oil-rich Iranian Khuzestan province, on the Iraqi border. This leads to the first principle Saddam violated:

“War is… an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will”Carl Von Clausewitz, On War.3

The capture of the Khuzestan province would be unlikely to have compelled the Iranian regime to resort to peace, and a counterattack to regain the oilfields. If there was an expectation that the Iranian regime would collapse, it proved catastrophically wrong and was poorly informed. At the time of Operation Barbarossa4, Hitler was reported to have said “If we kick the door in, and the whole rotten structure will come crashing down”. This should serve as a lesson to anyone trying to bring a regime to its end through an invasion of that regime’s territory without physically removing it.

In directing and interfering with military plans, the self-styled general directed his military to mount the initial 1980 offensive in a widely dispersed 7-division assault without a center of gravity or a main thrust as shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1: Initial Iraqi Offensives, September 1980 [3]

It is clear from the above figure, that another of Clausewitz’s principles was violated.

“The best strategy is always to be very strong; first in general, and then at the decisive point… There is no higher and simpler law of strategy than that of keeping one’s forces concentrated.”
Carl Von Clausewitz, On War.

By not being strong at a decisive point, Saddam effectively allowed the Iranians to regroup, and mobilize their superior population5 to counterbalance the more organized Iraqi forces. This failure would develop the conflict into a war of attrition.

It was only at the end of the war, in 1988, after an exhausting 8-year war that bankrupted both belligerents that Saddam had the opportunity to end the war by attrition. The use of chemical weapons, ballistic missiles, and the capture/destruction of large amounts of Iranian heavy equipment in highly-scripted operations.

The Iranian government, internationally sanctioned and without a sufficient domestic arms production capacity, agreed to the UN-sanctioned ceasefire which Saddam had been seeking since 1982. And therefore Clausewitz’s next quote was relevant:

“What do we mean by the defeat of the enemy? Simply the destruction of his forces, whether by death, injury, or any other means — either completely or enough to make him stop fighting. . . . The complete or partial destruction of the enemy must be regarded as the sole object of all engagements. . . . Direct annihilation of the enemy’s forces must always be the dominant consideration.” Carl Von Clausewitz, On War.

Saddam thereby defeated the Iranians as per Clausewitz’s definition. But he failed in his initial objectives. It could be argued that his initial will was to capture the Khuzestan province, and that he failed in that critical point in war, thereby failing by Clausewitz’s definition. It could also be argued that the war was actually two wars, the initial leading to an Iraqi defeat and the secondary leading to and Iraqi victory. In any case, “the result in war is never final” eventually rang true, and debt accumulated during the Iran-Iraq war encouraged Saddam to invade Kuwait in 1990.

References

[1] K. Torrez, V. Difronzo The Iran-Iraq War: Exceeding Means National Defense University (NDU) 20th October 2000. PP.3 URL: http://www.dtic.mil/cgi- bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA441679 Taken from the course: “Fundamental Statecraft and the Fundamentals of military thought and strategy” that was taught at the NDU.

[2] R. Takeyeh The Iran-Iraq War: A Reassessment The Middle East Journal – Volume 64, Number 3, Summer 2010, PP.365

[3] E. Karsh The Essential Histories: Iran-Iraq War 1980-1988 Osprey Publishing, 2002 PP .26

Background

Two days ago, an explosion in an Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) base near Tehran killed up to 27 people and wounded 15 more. The location, timing and target gives clues to the unfolding situation regarding an impending Israeli strike on Iran.

Target

Iran’s Shahab-3 ballistic missiles are significant in the fact that they can (theoretically) target Israeli targets within a CEP of 200m. This supposed accuracy gives it a great strategic advantage when attacking targets located in Israel. The Iranians are unlikely to ever use them in a unconventional or WMD role, especially against an adversary such as Israel. It would make sense that the Israeli military pre-emptively take out as many of these missiles as possible, as this would significantly hinder the retaliatory capability of the Iranian military. An Iranian/Hezbollah coordinated and fully concentrated offensive could wreak havoc on daily life in Israel.

Previous history of Attacks

On Oct. 16^th last year, there was an explosion in the Imam Ali Airbase in the Lorestan Province. This attack specifically targeted Shahab-3 missiles and resulted in a large amount of casualties, by some estimates 15 dead. The main suspected culprit was Mossad. Israel is suspected of carrying out a series of assassinations, bombings and attacks on Iranian scientists. It is also suspected that with German private/govt. assistance (as the equipment targeted is manufactured by Siemens Germany), Israel designed and deployed the Stuxnet worm to cause Iranian nuclear centrifuges to spin out of control and suffer irreparable damage.

Analysis

The attack on the IRGC base seems like a Mossad operation, (Update: Reported to have killed founder of Iran’s missile program) one of a part of previous operations that have been undertaken against Iranian targets suspected to be part of the nuclear program or part of its defensive/retaliatory capability. The high number of casualties may be indicative of a targeting of missile crews along with missiles, launchers and other personell. Experience from the Intifada shows that the Israeli intelligence services are very capable of planting explosives in completely unexpected places. One case relates to a Palestinian militant leader being killed by a bomb planted in his mobile phone. To have someone go into a base, plant these explosives and detonate them signifies a high-stakes operation, as the person who planted them is highly likely to have been properly identified. A high-stakes operation makes it more likely that such an attack would be a matter of urgency. Therefore, it can be assumed that the Israelis are highly concerned by the Iranian retaliation capability, and may be attacking Iranian retaliatory targets in advance of an airstrike on Iranian nuclear facilities and the retaliation this could incur.